Chapter 3: 'Stranger'

'Stranger'

If the Chapter 2 was somewhat confusing, we would do good to repeat the major points contained in it. This is even more important, when we know (from the Introductory Chapter) that our discussion is about to take a radical turn. The text's argument is that to understand the Bosnian conflict we need to go beyond apparent iconography of the same, i.e. we need to leave behind the entire signification process that is often put in play and that, as such, has no future regarding a peaceful 'living together' within the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In previous chapter the text's aim has been to address the issue of 'nationality' or / and 'ethnic group' with a purpose of trying to define the nature of the conflict we are dealing here with. For that matter, three ways of national consciousness have been presented. Or to put this differently, we have seen how a national identity has been constructed in the former Yugoslavia and that this model, almost certainly does apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The three ways have been defined as a pre-modern (or blood-line), a modern (or state sponsored) and a post-modern (or a matter of individual's choice). However, the reality of Bosnian conflict has seen the presence of three major national, or ethnic identities, each one with different Religion and each one with different interests. Question of all questions, when discussing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been: how do we define the nature of that war? In other words, the task has been to decide whether the Bosnian war had been a civil war, or an expansionist or separatist war, or a religious war. This seems to be very significant point in most discussions about this war. Contrary to common assumptions, we have presented points that both, affirm and negate each of the three options with an intent to create plausible ground for the notion of 'stranger', which we will discuss at length in this chapter. This text's proposition has been further strengthened by a suggestion that derives from Hegel's statement according to which, "what is, is not and what is not, it is". Following this statement, we have proposed that if something were 'all of the above (civil -, religious -, or separatist / expansionist war)' it could well be that it is none of the above. Further on, we have suggested that if one type of explanation is always linked with one side involved in conflict, and is as such unacceptable for other sides, then such an explanation is either incorrect or one-sided.

As already said, in this chapter we will try to address the issue of Bosnian conflict in a very new way, via the notion of 'stranger'. But what do we do with Bosnians (Muslims and others who see themselves as Bosnians), Croats and Serbs, since they form the kernel of Bosnian war? These ethnic or national signifiers are a reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina and no one can change this. What could be done, and what needs to be done is to put these signifiers into a social perspective, i.e. to address their positive and their negative nature and to analyze the same within a context that is often referred to as "socialization process". Once we have done this, we can strip off the masks of national or ethnic identity (or any other socially constructed identity). This is important for us in order to reach a bare or 'naked' individual and then build up a theory (applicable to Bosnian conflict and possibly even beyond it) where we will encounter an indwelling stranger and an oncoming stranger - both of which, are notions of highest significance for this text's approach to the BLOODY nature of Bosnian war, that took place towards the close of Twentieth Century in the middle of 'civilized' Europe and at the doorsteps of a rapidly unifying Europe (European Union).

-Bosnian realities

Ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is far richer then the three major ethnic groups. Not all of Bosnian population belongs to Croats, Muslims (Bosnians) or Serbs. Profile of Religions present in Bosnia and Herzegovina exceeds the number three - this number referring to three major religious communities, i.e. to Catholics, to followers of Islam and to Orthodox. However these two threes, in ethnic and in religious sense are major protagonists of the Bosnian conflict. These two threes also refer to a coalition of political parties that had defeated Communists or that had won the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two threes, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs, and Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox form a constitutive national structure of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More or less, one is able, particularly now, to draw lines across the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that could depict one nationality as being predominant within one region, another nationality within another etc. But it also needs to be noted, that only some fifteen years before the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, in ethnic sense, most of Bosnian population were unconcerned with their ethnic background (in a sense that they would make an issue out of it). Also, some fifteen years before the collapse of the former Yugoslavia most of population would have counted as Atheists. All that mattered in religious sense, had been religious festivals for the sake of good food and good drinking and hardly anyone restricted him- / herself to attend only one's own religious festivals. It needs also to be noted, this had been a situation probably more applicable to Bosnian cities than to country side, and in particular to Sarajevo - Bosnian capital renown for a very rich 'night life', and as such highly desired as winter holiday destination in Zagreb (capital of Croatia) as well as in Belgrade (capital of Serbia). This had been further stressed by a very rich entertainment offer of Sarajevo, coupled with the city being a home town to the most popular rock-bend of the former Yugoslavia (Bijelo Dugme). No one in his or her right mind would have expected that only ten years of post Tito* time will be enough to destroy a fairly cosmopolitan spirit of Bosnian cities, of Sarajevo in particular. Whether the situation in Bosnian rural areas had been any or much different is unknown to me. *(Josip Broz Tito, the one and only president of the former Yugoslavia, often incorrectly, in my humble opinion, referred to in Occidental world as a "dictator").

Be it as it may, 1992 had seen the three ethnic political parties engaged in a bitter dispute over the future of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croats and Bosnians were interested in an independent state, Serbs wanted to remain within some modified Yugoslav state. The former two organized a referendum on the issue and the latter organized its referendum on the issue. The outcomes of both referendums had been pretty much predictable. It all suited only to further bolster ethnic sense in citizens. It all also suited to neutralize a voice of an indifferent observer. And it all had been generously helped from Croatia and even more so form Serbia. The rest is a bloody war history raging from 1992 to 1996.

Post war Bosnia and Herzegovina still bears all the hallmarks of the pre war Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war is over, reconstruction and rebuilding are progressing fairly good. In political sense, each ethnic group has got more or less its own area of jurisdiction. Croats and Bosnians merged into a federation and Serbs semi-autonomous (there still exists and functions federal government) in their ethnic territory. What is missing are tens of thousands of dead persons and tens of thousands of persons dispersed across the globe. What is missing is a clear cut picture of recognized responsibility for the four years of chaos. What is missing is a view of a brighter future in which one will see a person and not ethnically colored individual backed or acting on behalf of his or her ethnicity. No ethnic group can claim a victory but the whole population has ended up being losers. This is further reiterated by international community taking away centuries old emblems of Bosnian state, that existed in a time when there was only a Bosnia as a state (kingdom), its people as Bosnians and its church as the Bosnian Church...

'Strangers' don't like foreign symbols...

-Bosnian realities and "socialization process"

Previous section of this chapter has attempted to show that major protagonists of the Bosnian war have been the 'problem makers' and the 'problem solvers', albeit due to a considerable pressure imposed by international community. Now, if Croats, Bosnians and Serbs were the problem makers and then again the problem solvers, one wonders why did war happen in the first place. The Bosnian war has not produced any winners as is often case in a war. Losers on the other hand are many, although we do not intend to discuss their position. The Bosnian reality refers to those who still live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and among those, many 'losers' have to reinvent their existence. So, and as we have concluded the previous section, it is still a matter for Croats, Bosnians and Serbs to find a way for a good and prosperous state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Our attention now shifts in a direction that deals with socialization process. This is very important as we need to both, define and identify the wheels of socialization process in order to make a categorization based on another set of terms, which will help us, or help them, living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to make a clear distinction between what is essential and what is inessential - in this case, the "inessential" refers to artificial construction that entails certain purpose but that at the same time categorizes that purpose as not essential. Only after this has been done, can we embark on a journey that uncovers problem of the Bosnian war as being a problem that stems from a human being and where all other descriptiveness is only part of signification process that reduces a human being to a set of symbols.

By definition, socialization process denotes a way, through which an individual from its earliest stage on is being brought into society. Instances that carry out socialization process are present already in a society. Of course, we always start with family, then move on to a community until we get to the point, when an individual becomes a member of society in its own right. Louis Altusser calls these various instances of socialization process "ideological state apparatus". The economy deployed during significant part of socialization process is, according to Habermas' appropriation of Freud, based on tenets of "substitute gratification". In other words, an individual 'learns' how to become a member of a society via rewards for achievements and punishments for failures. An infant is being, courtesy of substitute gratification, instructed as to 'what goes and what doesn't go'. The serious question remains, to what extent are those things that 'doesn't go', removed from individual's mind? Or to what extent are these 'doesn't go-s' postponed for a later period, when an individual will be on its own. The whole matter of this game has as its purpose taming of an individual via channeling and directing that individual to become an acceptable member of society. Another question is, what happens if socially approved behavioral pattern is changed due to a social change? In other words, and as has been the case in Bosnia (and not only there), what happens with 'appropriate behavior' if the society undergoes a change from communist ideology to some new, but essentially 'private property' ideology? Or we may even formulate this question in another way: what happens when a spirit of cosmopolitanism is substituted with a spirit of tribalism, or with that of nation state - to use less loaded terminology? The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina developed exactly along these lines. Common property of a cosmopolitan communism has been substituted by a private property with the scent of national particularism further flavored by religious affiliation. These all present a shock for any individual that has been learned in one way and then has come to face a total reversal of his / her learned behavior. And if I may remark, we are dealing here with a reversal that is characterized by a step backward and not by a step forward in relation to the content of an ideology. We may argue endlessly, to what extent is a resurrection of private property a move forward and not also a move backward but let us assume that it is. What is most important for as at this stage, is a moment that allows, and that has actually taken place in Bosnian reality, a significant shift in values belonging to one type of socialization process, due to a social change.

So, here is our question: if there are values that vary depending on ideological content prevalent in a given society, how are we to characterize these values? In other words, do values that depend on ideological content count as essential or as inessential? All those who have gone through the experience of raising a child or children, may start being very suspicious about this whole discussion, since they will remark, one has to bring a child up in a certain way that will conform to demands of any given society. And we also agree with this, but what we cannot and should not agree with is an equal treatment of essential and of inessential values. In other words, there are values that count as essential in any society and within any socialization process but there are values that are inessential and that belong to particularization aspect with intent of creating or maintaining social cohesion. We may need to explain these distinctions in 'plain terms'. Moments of socialization process that teach an individual to act justly, to promote goodness, love, peace, tolerance etc. can be found in any society and these we characterize as essential moments since they all promote life. From time to time (if not all the time), we encounter various forms of attributive additions to these essentials. And not all of these attributive additions are exactly in service of further promoting the essentials in question. So, whenever an attributive addition comes to hold a sway over an essential moment, the same (the essential moment) becomes inessential. What do we mean by attributive addition? What is the concrete content of this attributive addition in relation to our study? We all know, that the USA has been built upon precepts of protection and prosperity of an individual that both encompass what we call "freedom of an individual". There is nothing wrong about it. But, the moment we start talking about the "American way of life" we have introduced an attributive addition to something that is essential. This attributive addition tells or sends out a message that the freedom of an individual, in terms of its protection and prosperity, belongs to the "American way of life". Further more, as such both, protection and prosperity as components of an essential moment called freedom of an individual, come to be viewed as inessential since they have acquired that attributive addition of "the American way of life". Some may object that this is either harsh or way out place, but it is exactly that through language 'things' are colored with all possible colors to the point of being unrecognizable as such. Therefore and in this concrete example via the attributive addition "American" as an inessential moment, the essential moment called freedom of an individual has become inessential.

Hopefully, we can already anticipate similar differentiation on inessential and essential within the context of Bosnian reality. "Serbs have always loved freedom", "Islam promotes justice", "Our Catholic faith", "We will not allow to be dominated by others" etc. You be the judge and try to decompose these statements and then go on to identify their essential and inessential references. Their object lesson is that Serbs', Croatian or Bosnian, or that Orthodox, Catholic or Islamic all belong to inessential moments. They have a purpose of social maintenance and cohesion on one side but result in reducing an already finite spirit to its tribal boundaries, as opposed to the development evident globally that attempts to remove all boundaries (the attempt is evident but the boundaries are still well present in particular along certain geographical and cultural lines). Simply said, there is nothing essentially 'ours' that cannot be found in others. The language we speak, the way we write, the places of worship, the cultural practices and similar, they are all circumstantial. All these may well be nurtured and cultivated but not to the point, when these will be used at the expense of others.

Now, if we are able to identify various moments of a socialization process, we will do good to make clear distinctions between what is essential and inessential, between what matters and what doesn't. Of course, problem is that social cohesion organized around any given state is reluctant to give up on iconographic symbols of signification process. But it is even greater problem when these start to dictate or dominate behavior of individual or a group of individuals. What needs to be remembered is that various inessentials are being used without regard that the same could perhaps backfire - that is what has happened not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but across Balkan Peninsula. That we all tend to look for a refuge or a place of flight is doubtless, but an awareness is required that someone's refuge may be some else's deluge. Yes, we all tend to wave with our Serb, Croatian, or Bosnian banners, we all tend to hold our Catholic, Orthodox or Islamic relics but we need to realize that behind Serb, Croatian or Bosnian banners is nothing else but a human being, we need to acknowledge that behind Orthodox, Catholic or Islamic relics is nothing else but a finite human being longing for an infinite. Whether along the ethnic lines or those of religion, it is a human being we are dealing here with, albeit a human being lost in coldness, looking for a belonging to something else, to something bigger than itself.

However unique, this human being is often if not all of the time, divided within itself. Or as we have remarked, we often encounter a tamed human being. But what is tamed could go wild as well. All that is needed is right (wrong of course) buttons to be pushed and there you have in front of yourself an unknown strange creature starting immediately to organize itself in a monster, wreaking havoc and bringing disaster upon other fellow human being, because it is only a stranger and not me. When it gets really scary is when a stranger within me, encounters a stranger within my enemy. Why? Strangers do not go against each other, they go against us.

So who are those strangers that are so violent, so ruthless in their dealings, so unscrupulous towards others? What or who is behind those ghostly figures that do not hesitate to shoot at what ever moves? Who is that phantom, who throws bombs on unsuspecting civilians, from his secure hiding place? I name all these 'evildoers' with one simple name and that name is "Stranger". By definition, "stranger" is someone we don't know. Questions to be asked are: do we really don't know this stranger, is this stranger so strange that we cannot recognize him / her (but its mostly him), and finally what forms does this stranger may take on, in order to remain as such, a stranger? Let us simplify the whole stranger thing and narrow it down to its two most commonly encountered forms. Once we do that, we can discuss that stranger in more detail. Firstly, a stranger is an oncoming object. Some may immediately protest against this term "oncoming object" as we know that a stranger essentially refers to human being, and we need not treat others as mere objects but as we will see, reality posits the oncoming stranger as nothing else but an oncoming object. Secondly, we encounter this stranger as an "indwelling stranger"; someone with in us yet someone totally unknown to us. Or to use more technical term, its none other than the repressed self. This constitutes the kernel of this study's argument: Bosnian war had been a war between strangers, between an 'indwelling' stranger and an 'oncoming' stranger

-"indwelling stranger"

There shouldn't be too much confusion as to what or to whom the term "indwelling stranger" may refer. Perhaps it wouldn't hurt, however, to give some substance to this term, as many may be reluctant to accept such a proposition. And the proposition of an "indwelling stranger" sounds pretty much like a beast within, a monster unleashed, a savage let loose due to outside circumstances. Outside circumstances do not diminish the "indwelling stranger's" responsibility by any means. They just present coming into place of parameters that may make an "indwelling stranger" embark on his murderous mission. Further on, we also can affirm that fortunately, not every single individual in Bosnia and Herzegowina has had his "indwelling stranger" unleashed. "Indwelling stranger" is in all of us. It is just that the means of control over this beast vary in their degree. Something like a pain thresh hold - some people, on a scale 1 - 10 scream already at 3, others remain silent. Now, why is it that some are able to keep in check their own indwelling stranger and others not is a different question and we better not venture to attempt any explanation on this matter. But what we can and need to do here is to give plausible substance to the notion of "indwelling stranger". And for this matter, we will use propositions forwarded by some 'big guns' from the field of Social Theory. We hope to be able to give some well founded ground to "indwelling stranger" idea.

Everyone of us undergoes a certain process that in the end makes us capable of being members of society. This is usually what is called "socialization process". Socialization process describes a way via which, from an earliest age, individual is being directed in her / his behavior so that when the time comes, she or he can become integrated part of society. Louis Altusser describes this process as unfolding via the so called "Ideological State Apparatus". Ideological State Apparatus conveys to an individual what goes and what doesn't. This conveying takes place within family, school, work place and similar. These are only the most obvious 'institutions'
of the State Ideological Apparatus (other but no less important are Religious community, sporting society, social associations etc). All these show an individual the way society she/ he lives in works. Now, every individual on its way of introduction into society makes mistakes. More over, an effort has been put in place that will encourage appropriate behavior and at the same time discourage the inappropriate one. Jürgen Habermas terms this as "substitute gratification". Every good action is rewarded and every not so good action straighten up by appropriate punishment. Further on, following and acting as told results in rewards. Basic concept is, if an individual is inclined to do "a" which is not considered as appropriate, she/he will be encouraged to refrain from "a" with certain rewards and instead to do "b", which may well be appropriate - that is what is meant by "substitute gratification". Some may ask, if this is so and if everyone learns more or less how to behave, act and think in a socially appropriate way, why would things go wrong. Firstly, it needs to be stated, untamed, hidden, repressed or chained individual is still there, very much. That part of individuality does not appear to the surface but it is very much present, like a potent danger. Every story how we are all more or less good, rests on both, very strong repression forces acting upon the beast, and very poor knowledge of one self. All that it takes are different circumstances and those 'good' individuals may or will turn ugly. Therefore we need to go back to the pre-war existing circumstances.

We have mentioned earlier, that the dominant system of thought in former Yugoslavia had been that of Marx's Communism. We can also with utmost certainty say that that system of thought had had its up sides and its downsides. Let us first embark on its downsides. Communist Yugoslavia had not been able, despite all natural riches, favorable geographic position and beautiful and long Adriatic coast line, to provide sufficient material power for its individuals. How ironic of a system that rests on premises of Historical Materialism. Preferred mode of ownership was the one of 'collective' or 'state' ownership. Whilst private property had not been banned altogether, everything had been done to hamper its growth. Moreover, most of individuals whose source of income rested on private business, had been regarded as somewhat at odds with the state. In the 10 years period, between Tito's death and beginning of conflicts (in Slovenia at first) things have started to change regarding the private ownership but to what extent had that change been backed by appropriate legal regulations its unknown to me - and one may easily argue that legal regulations had not followed in step with ownership shift. So to sum up, and despite these mentioned developments, ideological state apparatus of Education had remained firmly entrenched along the lines of Communist Ideology.

In respect to 'spiritual' aspect, Religion had been regarded as old fashioned, out dated, and more of a thing for those of lesser intelligence. The way of Communist Ideologists was the way of Atheism. Some may say, there is nothing wrong with such disposition towards Religion but once we realize that this had been the only acceptable disposition, then there is everything wrong with such disposition. Every religious form that rests on claims of superiority over other religious forms and that will use all available resources in order to dampen and do away with all other religious forms is essentially wrong. Atheism is religious form and it rests on its own atheistic dogma coupled with atheistic rituals that result in an atheistic way of life. Its a belief system as any other belief system in the world. It is intolerant towards other Religions, as a form of Religion as had been Christianity throughout the Middle Ages - remember the Gulags of Soviet Union, remember the year 1949 in Yugoslavia. Communism does not tolerate any other Religion beside or along side it self. Membership in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been regarded as the most important step in the life of an individual - hm, pretty much something like baptism in Christianity. In the years between Tito's death and beginning of conflict in Yugoslavia, this spiritual aspect had undergone slight change in relation to tolerance yet, Atheism had been preached as the only dogma from pulpits around all educational institutions.

On the positive or up side of Communist era, we must stress cosmopolitanism. Under cosmopolitanism we may understand here notions that do away with racial and ethnic barriers. Ethnicity as such was irrelevant. Most individuals would in that respect, declare themselves as Yugoslavs (this text's author included). Further more inter ethnic marriages and children from those marriages could find themselves only under the umbrella of "Yugoslavism". This had allowed 'us' to claim possession over the whole of former Yugoslavia, where as those who still saw themselves within one or another ethnic group, could only claim possession over the territory where their ethnic group was in majority.

We could go on to list more positives and negatives, related to the rule of Communists in former Yugoslavia. However the above mentioned positives and negatives, will help us the most, in my opinion, to understand exactly, what was about to happen, beginning with the year 1990 and in relation to "indwelling" stranger. We will focus our interpretation on Bosnia only, simply because Bosnia and Herzegowina is the concern of this study, and because Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to deal with the same problem (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and FYR Macedonia are more homogeneous regarding the Ethnic aspect). First democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegowina took place in 1990. These elections and the campaign that preceded them mark frontal attack on individual and collective psyche in Bosnia and Herzegowina. They also mark the definite Social Change in B&H. Why is this so? According to Jürgen Habermas, conditions for social change a ripe, once the available social structures do not offer space for movement to emerging social-political-economic forces. Communism and collective or state ownership of property in 1990 were both, dead, and because still in power, also a major obstacle for emerging social-political-economic forces. The political campaign of new democratic parties had been fought along the lines of economic, social and political change. In Economic sense, private ownership was making big inroads into Bosnian reality. In social sense, to be a Muslim, Croat or a Serb, to confess Islam, Catholicism or Eastern Orthodox religion was showing an unstoppable trend. In Political sense, one party rule and membership in Yugoslavia (at least on part of Muslims and Croats) became something that needed to be abandoned altogether. The outcome of the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegowina, showed that private ownership, ethnicity, and democracy and independence had been the winning points for three national parties (in a sense, even for Sebrs an independence from other ethnic groups with the so called Greater Serbia was a form of independence). The individual psyche, that was already shaken to a greater extent with events that had been unfolding in former Yugoslavia since 1980, after the elections of 1990 so to speak collapsed altogether. New Ideological State Apparatus was set in place with an immense amount of vacuum to be filled. Yet a concrete new content was missing. By the concrete new content I understand an in place put new ideological state apparatus that will provide individuals with 'new' guidelines and also shed some light over the new situation. In other words and in an ideal set of circumstances all that was needed to be done was to stress, that essentially nothing has change apart from some reconstructions that need to be done in respect to political situation of former Yugoslavia, and that the taboo of private ownership has been removed. Why this hasn't been done, can be discussed without an end but let me propose here one obvious reason for this failure. The same (this failure) was about to bring so much suffering, death, pain and destruction over the Bosnia for the next 6 years (in particular from 1992 to 1996). Newly elected democratic ideologists had never had in mind to realize what they had preached to the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All their goals ended with rather narrow minded notions of entering into the history of their respective ethnic groups, and also some private economical aggrandizement. Should this be enough to classify those ideologists as proper cases for mental institutions is not up to me to decide? However, my decision on this is a positive and emphatic: "Yes";
As stated earlier, individual psyche in relation to the process of socialization had collapsed. Apart from sporadic acts of lunacy this still would not have been enough to amount for large scale atrocities. However, the"indwelling" stranger is released at this moment. His apparent inactivity is due to fear of legal consequences. Or to put this differently, "indwelling' stranger had been resurrected due to the fact, that all content that had been repressing 'him' throughout his life has been removed, proven wrong and defeated on elections. The 'stranger's' inactivity had been due to uncertainty weather his action would be punishable by the law or not. It will take collective psyche to collapse as well, in order to unleash the 'indwelling' stranger's fury. The dilemma had been: should I or shouldn't I; lets see if this works or not, and similar. These and similar questions were given legitimacy by collective psyche and slowly step by step, explorations into the 'beyond the law' had started taking place. This tit for tat will play itself out for about two years until finally the collective psyche is able to convince itself, that it will pay out to make a move. The war broke out in 1992. Further more, the 'indwelling' stranger had called for his best mate in order to make things worst. The 'oncoming' stranger was on his move. Between the two reigns a total ignorance of the other, and yet a total harmony in their evil paths; between the two there is nothing else but the battle for supremacy that will allow them to engage in a bloodthirsty battle. Each one thinks: who cares, I neither know the other nor will I ever know the other!!! Of course the other is unknown, because the other is none other than the self, the repressed self though!!! Why is the other unknown? Very simple, the repressed self has become self, the 'indwelling' stranger has taken the rule, and all up until that point existing restrictions are done away with. Now guess what? The other indwelling stranger has undergone the same process. All that differs between the two is Ethnicity and Religion. In other words, say newly emerged self, which is essentially 'indwelling' stranger considers his own Ethnicity and his own Religion as the dominant one and hence the other Ethnicity and Religion need to be kept in check or trampled down. Same principles unfold concomitantly in all three Ethnic groups and Religions. Let us turn now to the 'oncoming' stranger.

- Oncoming stranger/object
A human being cannot be considered as an object unless the situation distorts a human being into an object. Within crowd psychology or 'mob mentality' this is exactly what happens!!! Within the context of mob mentality, the outsider is reduced to the level of object in particular when we deal with situations that involve use of force. So who ever is not with us, is against us - sounds familiar? Who ever finds itself outside a particular group and within a situation that involves use of force, becomes mere object that needs to be done away with, one way or the other. This is however only one side of this 'oncoming stranger/object coin. We have stated that we are dealing with situations that do not border on normality, that is, with situations where use of force becomes predominant means of communication, or in plain language, we are dealing here with a situation that is called WAR. So, we have an oncoming stranger/object and interestingly enough, we find ourselves already within a group, a crowd, a mob. So an oncoming stranger views us as mere objects, because we are not part of his mob, but we also view him as a mere object because he is not part of our mob. This is the other side of our stranger/object coin. We have two sets of stranger/objects on a collision course with one another. For either of these groups, the other is nothing but an object meaning: something that can easily be done away with. Now in the case of Bosnian war (possibly in case of any other war as well), there is an additional strangeness to oncoming strangers. We don't know them, they don't know us and this makes the whole thing of doing away with, or of killing or murder much easier. And because we will most probably never meet them again, a green light is given, a further impetuous provided for murderous actions. And so the story goes on - another grenade, another bomb, another sniper shot, another massacre ... If I'm the one pulling the trigger in most of previously named situations, I don't even see my target (sniper is notable exception), In all of those situations I don't know my target. All I know about my target is, that he / she is located on another side and that her / his side is an obstacle to my side's goals and hence as such that obstacle is nothing more than an object. The sooner the object is destroyed the better. The sooner the object is done away, the sooner my side (mob) can revert to normal living. Problem gets its blood thirsty feature once an independent observer realizes: "the sentiment must be the same on both sides!"

Chapter 2: Ethnic Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Chapter 2: Ethnic Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina

To give an analytical interpretation of both, war and post war situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not seem to be a problem, but to elevate such interpretation above signification process that one often encounters when dealing with this particular subject, presents a highly confronting venture and requires 'cool heads' if any progress is to be made. What is meant by 'cool heads' is simply a willingness to make some concessions on behalf of one or another side involved in conflict. All of us who have attempted to address the 'Bosnian problem' need not to forget a folks wisdom that goes "woe to a land through which an army has passed." Interestingly enough, this folks wisdom, often heard on Balkan peninsula, succeeds or fails to differentiate between 'our army' and that 'of our enemy'. This provides us with valuable insight in relation to our discussion. So, we have assumed that commonly encountered terminology is only used as an excuse, and that this terminology at the same time covers up some other 'stuff', which is distinctive of human behavior or of human nature. Hence in our Introductory chapter we have stated that iconographic terminology used in Bosnian conflict (and not only in that one), needs to be unraveled in order that an acceptable interpretation of this conflict could be reached. As long as our interpretations bounce between Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, we will not be able to get out of that circle, we will not be able to live together and most importantly we will be only preparing the ground for another conflict. Our proposition has been that the true nature of Bosnian Trilema could be resolved via the notion of 'stranger'. However, in this chapter our primary concern is to discuss the issue of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the issue of ethnic groups seem to feature so prominently in all discussions on this subject we need to address the same as well. But the intent of discussion in this chapter is not to establish who has done what, nor who has started the conflict, nor who is responsible for this or that. Although these moments may have certain relevance, our aim here is to show the complexity of the issue of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a purpose to reveal futility of all 'ethnic' based interpretations and in that way to open up a door for the notion of 'stranger', which will be presented in our next chapter.

When dealing with terms such as ethnic group or nationality, we need to reach a consensus regarding a definition of each of the terms. Once we have established what is a nationality and an ethnic group, we can move to the next step in which, our focus will center on ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (we are here only concerned with 'three' major players involved in the conflict between 1992 and 1996). This will help us firstly, to establish the 'apparent' nature of the conflict, i.e. we will try to answer questions whether this conflict is an aggression of one state on another, or is it civil war within one state - with more than friendly support of neighboring states, or is it essentially a religious conflict. In presenting a discussion that will appear to be supportive of either one of the three commonly entertained notions, we will try to point a reader in a different direction. This 'different direction', or as we will discuss it in the next chapter (the notion of 'stranger') is based on following analogies: If something is all of the above (we are referring here to three often proposed, and above mentioned, descriptions related to the nature of Bosnian conflict), then it is possible that it is none of the above, and if something is always evident as an expression distinctive of one group then it is as such either partly or entirely incorrect because the other side/s involved in conflict cannot accept such description. Both of these strains of thought only confirm that if there is no consensus, the whole problem rests on incorrect propositions.

1. Nationality and Ethnic Group

We must immediately ask: what do we mean by "nationality" and what do we mean by "ethnic group"? In 'western world' it is commonly assumed that nationality and citizenship are linked together. We will not seek some generalized definitions for these terms, but rather we will try to meet them there, where they seem to have reached its boiling point, i.e. on Balkans. History of the term's usage in former Yugoslavia, deviates from western 'definition'. Further more, both terms nationality and ethnic group have had more or less similar meaning. The term "ethnic" was usually used in conjunction with a "minority", as is most commonly but not exclusively the case in Vojvodina - the northern province of today's Serbia. Our understanding had been that "ethnic minority" represents an ethnic group, which has its origin outside the former Yugoslavia.

Firstly, nationality could be a 'blood' related issue. In other words, it is a matter of ancestry. So if one were born in a Serb family, one would be immediately considered as a Serb. This approach, which is still entertained on Balkans may have been applicable prior to the Second World War, but the reality of communist Yugoslavia has to some extent done away with this ancestral logic. So, apart from Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenians and Albanians (who were the major nationalities of the region before and during the times of former Yugoslavia), a need had arisen to accommodate those who were involved in, or were children from 'mixed' marriages, and also those who had similar cultural practices specific of one religion. In order to offer a solution to situation at hand, communists have introduced nationalities called "Yugoslavs" and "Muslims". The former presented a convenient solution for mixed marriages (not to mention that certain number persons, who could have claimed 'single blood' line nationality also opted for Yugoslavs) and the latter applied for a significant part of population linked with the religion of Islam - majority of Muslims inhabit Bosnia and Herzegovina. However good, these solutions had had to face with the post-modern mind set. The communist regime answered promptly and offered a definition of "nationality" according to which, "nationality is a sense of belonging to certain national or ethnic group". The latest population census in former Yugoslavia recorded a number of Eskimos living in Yugoslavia; "Eskimos" because persons opted to invoke sense of belonging to that ethnic group. It is important to state here, that our interest is not to establish whether the communist government acted correctly, or should one ask United Nations for definitions of the kind. We have described developments in Yugoslavia under communists for the sake of presenting a picture through or under which we grew up. And most of us were fine with these solutions either because the nationality didn't matter much or because we couldn't care less about tribalism of the past.

We need to mention Muslims as nationality as well. Although the date is irrelevant, the constitution of 1974 introduced Muslim as a nationality. Why it didn't introduce Bosnians and Herzegovinians as nationality, or nationalities is unknown to us. Communists must have followed the logic of presence in various geographical areas, when they had decided to introduce "Muslims" as nationality. It is true that most of Muslims inhabit Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they are to be found as majority in some other regions of the former Yugoslavia. Be it as it may, the fact is that the communists have made a precedent nowhere else to be found in the world. Muslim is a religious term describing a follower of Islam. However, this term has become ever since 1974 a synonym for a national belonging as well. It is only with post communist era, that in Bosnia and Herzegovina a certain move is evident towards a divorce between Muslim as a follower of religion and a description of nationality.

For the situation of a pre war Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have set the stage regarding an issue, that will pose a huge problem in a war that was about to break out in 1992. This is however only a fragment of the picture that we are just about to paint. From the above said, it may appear that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a war between three national entities or ethnic groups: Croats, Muslims and Serbs; it may appear that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a civil war between three major ethnic groups. However, nothing could be further from the truth than this.

In a summary of previous paragraphs, two things need to be noted. Firstly, the above paragraphs deal predominantly with situation as it had developed in former Yugoslavia between the Second World War and collapse of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of that state; it was one of six constituent republics. So, the development of national consciousness in Bosnia and Herzegovina was no different to that present in other republics of the former Yugoslavia. This had been the state of mind - if one is allowed to call it that way, which was soon to encounter a war. Secondly, and from the perspective of how a 'nationality' came to be determined, we have identified three distinctive paths. The first one we have called 'blood-line' and it was usually strongly linked with ancestry. For this matter we may call such a path as being a pre-modern. Next path was called into existence by a state - communist run government, and it was prompted by a new reality of mixed marriages. Therefore, this path can be identified as the modern one; the one that corresponds to a building of nation state; the one where 'reality' and statehood hold a precedence. Lastly, and as we have mentioned, and in accord with a world wide development of post-modernism, we have outlined a notion of nationality as being purely dependent on individual's choice. Therefore, national consciousness of the region rested on pre-modern, modern and post-modern premises.

2. Nationality and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Bosnian war broke out along the national lines. Or to be more precise, nationalities involved in Bosnian war were: Croats, Muslims and Serbs. Each one of these three had been represented in the first post-communist parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, via political parties with predominantly national agenda. Croats were represented through HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), Muslims through SDA (Party of Democratic Action) and Serbs through SDS (Serb Democratic Party). These three were by no means the only parties involved in the first democratic elections, nor were they the only ones with a distinctively national agenda, but they represented a coalition that had formed the first post-communist government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The question of nationality has immediately become an important issue. So much so, that one was willing to start a war over the same. What was the problem? From the perspective of Muslims, there was a general opinion that Bosnia and Herzegovina need to become an independent state. Croats were pretty much in accord with the idea of independence. Serbs on the other hand, were quite reluctant to accept such a possibility. Hm, an interesting situation, which only followed practice from two other republics of former Yugoslavia - Slovenia and Croatia. Arguments and counter arguments circling at the time were, both confusing and one sided. But the development on the ground favored those who advocated separation from former Yugoslavia.

In order to get a glimpse of this rather confusing picture we need to elaborate on at least three contention points: separatism, who are Muslims, and Serbs and Serbian aggression.

- Separatism or Independence

As noted earlier, Slovenia gained independence already and Croatia was soon to follow the suit. However, in Croatia a war between Croats and Serbs posed itself as a conflict of a longer nature. But it needs to be stressed, it was a war going on in an independent state of Croatia. This eastwards movement of requesting and gaining independence in its logical order (Slovenia, Croatia...) had reached Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, the war posed itself as the only way out. So, what were desires and concerns that one could hear as being voiced over and over again. Croats and Bosnians, as Slovenians before them, were very reluctant to stay in one state where the Serbs would be majority population. It may seem as legitimate concern and as valid reason for independence. Allegedly and according to Croats and then to Bosnians, Serbs had been both the dominant and dominating nationality of the former Yugoslavia. According to Serbs in Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to live in a state and with a state, where the Serbs would be ethnic minority, was unacceptable. That neither of these arguments is entirely wright nor entirely wrong may show itself if we switched from explicit statements to the implicit ones. If one was unwilling to live in a state where the others are majority, how would one treat that majority, now turned minority in a new state. In other words, Croats did not want to continue in a state where the Serbs are majority, but would quite easily live in a state where they, the Croats would be a majority - what kind of treatment do they have in place for the Serbs? The same analogy applies in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, this is only one half of implicitness or inversion of original arguments. Here is the second half. If the Serbs were unwilling to live in states, where they would become minority, would it mean that they had really been dominant and dominating nationality in the former Yugoslavia. If the Serbs are quite content with the notion of majority, why will they 'feel' other wise if they are to become minority, unless the notion of majority did have some benefits. Or to put all of this Balkan trickery into a more direct language: we can either live all, under my roof, or each needs to live under his own roof. But also, if you do not want to live under my roof, I will take everything what is mine with me and live under my own roof. One could really go into eternity with arguments and counter arguments of this kind.

Muslims are Serbs?

We have in previous paragraph introduced the notion of territorial pretension. What it meant was that the Serbs had been unwilling to live with Croats or Bosnians, in a 'third state' for that matter, but they had been quite content to stay where they had been and to live in some new state without Croats or Bosnians. With Bosnians, however, there was another problem. Who were those Bosnians or Muslims, since they had been a nationality in the former Yugoslavia? According to the Serbs, Muslims are mostly Serbs and to some extent Croats, whose ancestors had during the expansion of Ottoman Empire switched their religion for the Islam. Whether and to what extent this is true may be a valid discussion with a different subject. For the purpose of our discussion, we will mention only two points that may be of relevance.

Most probably the population who lived on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, prior the invasion of the Ottoman Empire, were Slavs. However, how good Serbs or Croats they were at the time is questionable. Old Bosnian State, also included, as its integral part, the Bosnian Church, which was more or less continuation of what used to be known as "Bogumils". Most of Bogumils had come to Bosnia from Serbia during a reign of Stevan Prvovjencani, later known in Serbian Orthodox Church as Sveti Sava. In an effort to Christianize Serbs into Orthodox Christianity, Sveti Sava had decided to expel, or other wise get rid off, all those who did not want to abandon Bogumil version of Christianity. So in a flight for their bare life, those Serbs, who had also been Bogumils crossed the river Drina and settled in Bosnia (not even during the peak of old Serbian kingdom, had that kingdom with its territory crossed the river Drina). However, Bogumils, or later Bosnian Church to a greater or lesser extent switched to Islam, when faced with Ottoman military might. Therefore, the Bosnian conflict may well be a religious war.

We have already used the term "Bosnians" many times. And we have mentioned that the Bosnian as a nationality does not appear in the 1974 constitution of the former Yugoslavia. Muslim, as a nationality does appear in that constitution but areas where Muslims are a majority population are not only restricted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the newly gained independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and we are again in 1992), has prompted for calls to establish "Bosnian" as a nationality. That these calls have come mostly from the Muslim part of population presents an obstacle, but an obstacle that needs to be overcome if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to establish itself as a modern state; for the post-modern Bosnia and Herzegovina a bit of time is needed.

-Serbs are Aggressors?

Notion of Serbs as aggressors has been widely entertained. But, to make such a claim, one need to take into account its implicit side as well. Firstly, Bosnian Serbs cannot be considered as aggressors since they are a part of Bosnian reality. If their intent had been to separate themselves from Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to join some 'all Serb' state, then they would have to be considered as separatists. Essentially, their attitude had been the one of separatism. Of course, there is a notion of Serbs as aggressors which includes a moment of an outside intervention executed by the reminder of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. by Serbia and Montenegro. It is more or less proven fact that military and para-military units had been deployed during the Bosnian war from the direction of Serbia and Montenegro in order to support Bosnian Serbs in their 'fight' for independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. But more importantly, the notion of an outside aggression had been often brought in conjunction with the use of military equipment belonging to former "Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)". So the Serbs had been using military equipment from the JNA. If the Serbs had been aggressors partly because they had used JNA military equipment, then the then Bosnian government would have acknowledged the ownership over the JNA military equipment as belonging to the rest of former Yugoslavia - to Serbia and Montenegro. In my opinion this equals to the sanctioning of the theft for the sake of argument's validity. Therefore, the only way to view behavior of the Bosnian Serbs is via the notion of separatism. This is further reinforced through Serb's 'dreaming' about 'Greater Serbia'.

What we have tried to clarify in previous paragraphs may well have left a reader more confused then a reader was confused before. Let us therefore recapitulate the above mentioned confusion, whilst keeping in mind that any argument put forward by any of the sides, backfires immediately, i.e. possesses its implicit side, which then can be interpreted either as unintentional confession or self-centered action that denies the same to the other side/s. Firstly, from the perspective of Serbs in Yugoslavia, and in particular of those in Croatia and Bosnia, developments in former Yugoslavia have been those of separatism. Reaction of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia has been the one of separatism as well. Willingness of Bosnian Serbs to live in a multicultural Yugoslavia has been met by their unwillingness to live in multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their unwillingness to live in multicultural bosnia and Herzegovina speaks in favor of them, Bosnian Serbs as pursuing an argument of "Greater Serbia", which then in turn, justifies separatism of the former Yugoslav republics - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Secondly, Serb's insistence that Bosnian Muslims are either Serbs or Croats turned Muslims implies that the nature of Bosnian conflict has been the religious one. In other words, Bosnian war is then to be understood as a war fought predominantly between Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Serbs. As such it is a religious war fought within one state and one ethnic group and hence bears most of the hallmarks of a civil war. And finally, the separatism of Bosnian Serbs militarily supported by the Serbs outside of Bosnia not only shows Bosnian Serbs as separatists but also presents them as aggressors against newly established independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Claims of aggression made by Bosnian government essentially sanction a theft committed by Serbs.

How do we then classify a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The above presented paragraphs seem to justify either of classifications usually heard in conjunction with this war. So, and as we haver earlier suggested, if the war could be 'either of the above', then it is most likely that it is none of the above. And if the war is presented in one way by one side of the conflict, in a way that is unacceptable to other sides involved in conflict, then its one-sided nature does not allow for a fuller understanding of the whole issue. Therefore, we need to look for answers elsewhere. We need to go beyond signification process, which partly also belongs to the process of socialization. This iconographic play of signification process we have also posited as a 'mind set' (pre-modern, modern and post-modern) of a developing consciousness. Hence the Bosnian war may also present a "clash of civilizations" in which the young post-modern mind has fallen a victim to the strength of a nation-state entrenched modern mind that draws its strength from a pre-modern 'blood-line' set of mind. However with the war behind us, it is up to a post-modern mind to resurrect and impose itself as a determining denominator if the lessons are to be learned and more importantly, if the animosities are to be buried - for good if possible. It is up to a post-modern mind to get rid of masks, which are used in order to justify and accomplish acts belonging to a time long gone by.

What our next chapter will try to do is to propose a look into a 'human nature' that can provide answers or at least generate a further discussion when dealing with conflicts of a war-like nature, such as the one we are dealing here. Our discussion aims to make use of a learning path in a sense that it identifies signification process and its iconography and then attempts to categorize the same between what is essential and what is artificial, essential as being a part of human being and artificial as a construction that serves certain purpose.